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Volume XXI May, 1933 Number 4
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-SURVIVORSHIP OF TORT
ACTIONS IN KENTUCKY
By ALvnv EvANs*
I. ACTIONS FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
An action for damages for death is maintainable (a) under
section six of the Statutes (our replica of Lord Campbell's Act),
(b) under section four, (the wanton or malicious use of firearms
section), (c) under section five (the dueling section), (d) under
the Federal Employers Liability Act1 and (e) under the Ken-
tucky Workmen's Compensation Act.2
Various statutes to discourage dueling have been passed in
Kentucky from a very early time3 under which, enter aia vari-
ous state officials (excluding members of the legislature by
special act of 1842) were required to take the non-dueling oath.
The first statute in Kentucky winch actually gave a remedy for
death by wrongful act, dueling, was passed in 1839 and ante-
dated the Lord Campbell's Act in England by seven years.
4 I
have found no court decisions dealing with recovery of damages
under this section. That is not surprismg in view of the other
available remedies.
Section four goes back to an act of March 10, 1856.5 It was
entitled "An Act to Prevent the Selling and Using of Certain
Weapons" It afforded the widow, or if no widow, the heirs, a
cause of action and was held to be unconstitutional because the
title embraced two subjects.6 It, in the meantime, was supple-
mented by another act in 18667 which gave the widow and the
*Alvin E. Evans, A. B. 1898, Cotner Univ., A. M. 1898, Univ. of
Nebraska, Ph. D. 1908; J. D. 1918, Univ. of Mich., attended Harvard
Law School, 1915-1916; Dean and Prof. of Law, Univ. of Kentucky Col-
lege of Law since 1927.
1 Carroll's Kentucky Statutes (1930), sections four, five, six; U. S.
Compiled Statutes on Employers Liability.
2 Sections 4880-4987 of Carroll's Statutes.
3Viz., in 1799, 1812, 1834, 1842.
III Statute Laws of Kentucky-Loughborough, page 572.
8I Acts 1855-6 Chapter 656, p. 96; 2 Stanton R. S., p. 509.4 O'Donaghue v. Akin, 63 Ky. 478 (1866).
'Acts of 1865-6, Chap. 85, p. 6. See also Bullitt & Feland G. S.,
Chap. 1, Sec. 4, p. 162.
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innor children a cause of action in certain cases. Its chief
difference from the dueling statute is that the cause of action
provided for arises from the "wanton or malicious use of fire-
arms or by any weapon known as Colts, brass-knuckles, or slung-
shots or other deadly weapon or sand-bag or imitation or sub-
stitute therefor"
Section six, our proper replica of the Lord Campbell's Act,
originated in 1854.8 The first section of this act was applicable
where the death of a non-employee of a railroad company had
been caused by negligence or carelessness of the railroad com-
pany A cause of action was created in the personal representa-
tive. The third section applied where the death of any person
had been caused by the wilful negligence of any person, etc., or
corporation but there was in the original act no provision for
special distribution and the recovery became assets of the estate.9
In 1859 an action was brought for damages occasioned by death
by shooting, under both the act "To Prevent the Selling and
Using of Certain Weapons" and under this act, but it was not
maintainable under the former act because the pleadings made it
inapplicable. It was maintainable, however, under the latter
act. Thus early the practical identity of the two statutory pro-
visions was recoguized.i ° Even to this day there is no substan-
tial difference since under section six the action must be brought
by the personal representative for the benefit of the surviving
spouse and minor children or if none of these exist for the sur-
viving parents both, or one, and if none of these, for the estate.
Under section four the widow and minor children, either or both,
must bring the action. So far the two are substantially parallel
save that section four provides only for the surviving widow. If,
however, there should be no widow or minor children there would
exist no cause of action under this section but a remedy would
still exist under section six, the action of course, being brought
by. the personal representative.
It is noted that the original act made mere negligence of a
railroad company sufficient to create a cause of action for the
death of a non-employee. In other cases it was necessary to
prove wilful negligence. Consequently, for a wrongful act in-
s I Acts 1853-4, Chap. 964, p. 175.
9 Cf. Berg v. Berg, 105 Ky. 80, 48 S. W. 432 (1898).
"I hiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. 146 (1859).
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tended there could be no recovery The court also interpreted
this statute in such a way that there could be no recovery by the
personal representative where there was no widow nor minor
children though the statute declared no such limitation but pro-
vided the widow, heir, or personal representative might sue. 1
In 1893 the legislature revamped this statute as a result of sec-
tion 241 of the constitution of 1890. The important changes
were (a) a cause of action was created in any case whether or
not the decedent left behind him certain specially mentioned dis-
tributees and (b) the distinction between railroads and other
persons was eliminated and the negligence of railroads and the
wilful negligence of others (which excluded intended acts) was
altered so that a cause of action for damages for wrongful death
thereafter would arise out of "negligence or wrongful act"
This alteration as above observed, made it possible to sue under
section six where the action arose from the negligence of a rail-
road or the negligence or the intended wrongful act of anyone
whatever.
It is not proposed here to make a study of the nature of the
remedy under the Federal Employers Liability Act,12 nor the
remedy under the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act.' 3
Parties, Defenses, Damages-Removal to Federal Court
Under section four it has been held that the widow may
sue alone without the minor children joining as plaintiffs and
vice versa. The children may bring a separate action by next
friend in such case and the widow cannot control the action nor
have their action dismissed.'- It has been held, however, that if
the widow does sue alone, the recovery is for both herself and
the children.' 5 This does not seem consistent with the holding
that each has a separate cause of action and that neither can
control the suit as respects the other. It would seem that on
motion of the defendant the parties should be required to join in
nHackett v. L. d N. By. Co., 95 Ky. 236, 24 S. W. 872 (1894),
Howard v. Hunter, 126 Ky. 685, 104 S. W 723 (1907), Lnlck v. L. & N.
R/. Co., 107 Ky. 370, 54 S. W 184 (1899), Trotta v. Johnson, 121 Ky.
827, 90 S. W 540 (1906).
12U. S. Compiled Statutes, Sec. 8657.
11 Carroll's Statutes, Sees. 4880-4987.14Martin v. Smith. 33 K. L. R. 582, 10 S. W 413 (1908).
's Archer v. Bowling, 166 Ky. 139, 179 S. W 15 (1915).
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a single action. Subsequent remarriage of the widow has no
effect upon her right of action.'"
A principal or master may be made a party defendant solely
on the ground of the rule respondeat superior Thus certain
steamboat owners were held liable for damages for the malicious
act of a deck-hand causing death.17 Naturally, a police officer
as well as his surebes, is liable for his own reckless konduet
resulting in the death of another by shooting.'8  In Howard v.
Caudill19 it was held that a sheriff was liable on his bond for is-
conduct of his deputy in causing death of the decedent while
making an arrest only if he were aiding and abetting the deputy
The court suggests the possibility of a different result if the
action were brought under section mx rather than under section
four. It is held that there is no liability here because section
four limits liability to the person who commits the killing. An-
other section, 20 however, provides that a sheriff shall be liable on
his bond for the act of his deputies and it is difficult to see how
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply There are
many cases in which the servant and the master have been made
joint defendants.2 '
An interesting set of facts is found in C. & 0 Ry. Co. v.
Maggard.22 Decedent while in the employ of the railway com-
pany and while swinging a light from his window to signal the
conductor, struck a lever by his seat and received an electric
Supra n. 15.
"Morgan v. Thompson, 82 Ky. 383 (1884). This was under G. S.
Chap. 57, Sec. 3.
TsPetre v. Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 70 S. W 297 (1902), Howard
v. Hycen, 239 Ky. 233, 39 S. W (2d) 265 (1931), Bolton v. Ayers, 110
S. W 385 (1908 Ky.) (in such case the bond is given to the Common-
wealth or to the municipality but it is unnecessary to make either a
party.) Wells v. Lewis, 213 Ky. 846, 231 S. W 994 (1926) (the personal
representative may sue under section six). But the chief police officer
is also liable for the acts of his deputies. Vedtc. v. Derrzek, 224 Ky
332, 6 S. W (2d) 279 (1928) (a question of survivorship is raised here
where the deputy marshal injured plaintiff and the marshal died. The
marshal and his surety and the deputy were made defendants. The
court holds that the action for assault does not survive the death of
the principal and as the principal is absolved so is the surety. No
doubt the deputy continues liable. Commonwealth v. Hurt, 64 S. W 911
(Ky 1901). Action was under section four.
"228 Ky. 403, 15 S. W (2d) 245 (1929).
Section 4141.
21pug v. 0. & 0. RBy. Co., 101 Ky. 77, 39 S. W 695 (1897), Carter
Coal Co. v. Przchar, 166 Ky. 776, 179 S. W. 1038 (1915).
- 193 Ky. 259, 235 S. W. 736 (1921).
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shock from which he instantly died. His father, who was also
his personal representative, recovered a judgment for $4,000
against the Electric Light Company under section six. An
action was also brought by the same plaintiff against the Rail-
way Company under the Federal Employers Liability Act.
It was held that the Railway Company and the Light Company
were 3ont tort-feasors but that credit for the $4,000 need not be
applied on the judgment against the Railway Company because
the recoveries were in two different capacities. In the one action
plaintiff recovered for the benefit of the estate and it was a mere
incident that the father was a sole distributee; whereas in
the action under the Federal Act he recovered because of de-
pendency This seems technical. In the first place, however, the
first recovery was for "'damages to the estate" The statute de-
clares that if decedent leaves no widow, husband, or child, the
recovery shall pass to the mother and father and if the mother
be dead and the father living, the whole shall go to the father,
though the action is brought by the personal representative.
The statute has been held inapplicable to a city where the
negligent act causing death occurred m the performance of a
public duty and in the exercise of a governmental power28
Adoptive parents do not receive the distribution under this sec-
tion but it goes to the natural parents.24 It is no defense to
such an action that the wrongdoer is a lunatic. 25 He may be
wanton if not malicious.
Formerly and prior to 1893 it was necessary to allege gross
and wilful negligence except where the suit was brought by the
personal representative of a non-employee against a railway
company in which case the allegation and proof of negligence
was sufficient.26 The court was obliged to construe the words
"wilful" and "wanton" under the older statute saying that
"wanton" equals "careless" but not intentional. "Wilful"
meant something more than "reckless", "indifferent" and
"careless" and the pleading must allege acts showing "positive
Smitih v. City of LoutsvZle, 146 Ky. 562, 143 S. W 3 (1912).
"Jackson v. A~extou, 223 Ky. 95, 3 S. W. (2d) 177 (1928).
ZYoung v. Young, 141 Ky. 76, 132 S. W 155 (1910).
"*Loutsvifle Ry. Co. v. Raymond, 135 K y'. 738, 123 S. W 281 (1909)
(Case gives a good nstory of the legislative policy.)
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will or intention" to injure.2 7  Gross neglect was not necessarily
wilful and was not alone sufficient to state a cause of action.2s
For a freight train to approach a crossing at usual speed without
signaling is alone not sufficient to warrant exemplary damages. 29
Employment of a m'nor contrary to te terms of tite statute
is negligence per se and may give rise to an action under section
six3 This statute, however, does not prevent the employment
of a minor under fourteen in the sale of newspapers upon the
streets of a city of the sixth class, during a period other than
school hours.31 Where the parents have consented to the em-
ployment, however, and the action is brought for their benefit
by the personal representative, such consent will prevent a
recovery perhaps on the theory of contributory negligence. This
result clearly tends, however, to nullify the statute. Consent of
one parent will not prevent recovery for the benefit of the non-
consenting parent for whom one-half of the damages may still be
recovered. 32
So violation of the Federal Statute limiting the number of
consecutive hours of duty is negligence per se33 and violation of
an ordinance reqmrmg the maintenance of fire-escapes subjects
landlord to liability for damages for death of tenants by fire.34
Collusve settlements. If the personal representative
makes a collusive settlement in fraud of the statutory beneficiar-
ies the settlement may be set aside.3 5 If the defendant procures
the appointment of the administrator and the latter collusively
ity of Lexington v. Lerns, 73 Ky. 677 (1874) (Cistern was being
built and a fragment of stone blown out by a charge of dynamite,
killed plaintiff's infant son.)
"8L. & N. Ry. Co. v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403 (1883) (Brakeman killed
while coupling cars.)
21I. C. By. Co. v. Moss, 142 Ky. 658, 134 S. W 1122 (1911) (A train
was approaching and could not be seen by a traveller until h6 was upon
the track.), Schmsd v. L. & N. By. Co., 155 Ky. 237, 159 S. W 786
(1918). (Whether there is evidence of gross negligence is a question
of law, but whether defendant is guilty of it is one for the jury.)
31 Smith v. Nat. Coal Co., 135 Ky. 671, 117 S. W 230 (1909).
1 Cin. Times Star v. Clay, 195 Ky. 465, 243 S. W 16 (1922) (See
Carroll's Statutes, Sees. 331a-1-9-15.)
12Ky. Util. v. McCarty, 169 Ky. 38, 183 S. W 237 (1916).
"St. L. I. M. & So. Ry. Co. v. McWhzrter, 145 Ky. 427, 140 S. W 672
(1911).
"Mullins v. Nordlow, 170 Ky. 169, 185 S. W 825 (1916).
"Leach v. Owensboro Ry. Co., 137 Ky. 292, 125 S. W 708 (1910)(Widow killed by street car company.. Her brother was appointed ad-
ministrator and settled for $250.00. The children repudiate the set-
tlement.)
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refuses to sue, the widow and children may sue the wrongdoer
directly and join the personal representative 36 as a defendant.
In one case the beneficiary was permitted to sue the wrong-
doer without joining the personal representative.3 7 It is also
held that the beneficiaries cannot make a private settlement that
is binding on the personal representative and evidence of such a
settlement is incompetent as a defense but defendant may have
credit for the amount paid.38
Various other interesting conclusions have been reached, for
example, the fact that the wife is at the time living in adultery
has no effect upon the right of recovery in her behalf.3 9 Under
section six it is no defense to an action in behalf of the manor
children that the wrongdoer was their father and husband of
their mother.40 But it has been held that if the wife is childless
her administrator cannot sue the husband for wrongfully caus-
ing her death. 41 Where the personal representative has an
action both for wrongful death and for injury to personal prop-
erty caused by the same act, it is splitting the cause of action
to sue for wrongful death only and later to bring a separate
action for the personal property -4 2 The negligence causing
liability may be of the attractive nuisance variety 43 Further,
the one year limitation of actions is not violated by the fact that
an amendment is made after the year is passed where the amend-
3OMcLemore v. Sebree Coal Co., 121 Ky. 53, 88 S. W 1062 (1905)
(This result seems to follow from the Civil Code, Section 24.)
Harris v. Rex Coal Co., 177 Ky. 630, 197 S. W 1069 (1917) (The
father of decedent as personal representative made a collusive settle-
ment in fraud of the mother, wife of the personal representative. Per-
haps for this reason plaintiff was excused from joining the personal
representative.)
81 City of Louisville v. Hart, 143 Ky. 171, 136 S. W 212 (1911),
Slusher v. Weller, 151 Ky. 203, 151 S. W 684 (1912).
" Napzer v. Napier, 210 Ky. 163, 275 S. W 379 (1925) (Section 2133
makes a wife in such circumstances forfeit all interest in the estate,
but this recovery was never a part of the estate.)
'
0 Robznson v. Robinson, 188 Ky. 49, 220 S. W 1074 (1920) (One-half
recovery.)
"Dishon v. Dishon, 187 Ky. 497, 219 S. W 794 (1920) (The reason
is that the defendant is also the real plaintiff and this becomes a moot
case since neither party has a beneficial interest.)
12 Cole v. Ill. Cent. By. Co., 120 Ky. 686, 87 S. W 1082 (1905) (Both
decedent and his horse were killed by the railway company.)
4"Bransom v. Zabrot, 81 Ky. 638 (1884).
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ment is germane and does not change the nature of the cause of
action.44
If the cause of death was an act performed on a navwgable
river within the boundaries of the state the state courts have
jurisdiction and the state law applies under the Federal Act of
1789 by which rights are saved to suitors in civil cases falling
within United States admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 45
The wrongful act alleged must have been the proximate
cause of death. Thus where defendant sold.liquor to A and as a
result A became intoxicated and killed B, the act of defendant is
not the proximate cause of the death of B.46 So a sale of wns-
key by defendant to A who dies from the effects of the drinking
of it does not make defendant liable m the absence of a showing
either that the defendant intended to injure A, or knew that A
intended to drink enough to injure himself, or had reasonable
grounds to believe that A could not be trusted with whiskey 47
Finally, it is held that claimant under the statute is forbid-
den by the Civil Code 606-2 from giving evidence regarding con-
versataons and transactons with the decedent. So where a
father claims to recover against an employer of his minor son
employed contrary to statute, he may not give evidence as to
what he said to the son about the employment. The rule would
be different if the recovery went to the father as distributee of
the intestate estate rather than as statutory distributee under
section =i. 48  So in Souther v Belleau4 where defendant shot
and killed plaintiff's intestate, he was not permitted to tell of the
transactions between himself and the decedent just prior to the
shooting.
Damages. The measure of damages in Kentucky for wrong-
ful death is the sum which will reasonably compensate plainti
for the loss she will sustain by the destruction of the power f
44 L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Pointer, 113 Ky. 952, 69 S. W. 1108 (1902) (Act
of causing 'death was committed in Virginia. The petition did not
originally set out the Virginia statute on wrongful death), L. & X. v.
Greenwell, 155 Ky. 799 (1913) (Amendments filed four years later.)
Johnson v. Westerfield, 143 Ky. 10, 135 S. W. 425 (1911), Monon-
gahela Coal & olce Co. v. Lancaster, 169 Ky. 24, 183 S. W. 258 (1916).
4 Walter v. Collinsworth, 144 Ky. 3, 137 S. W 766 (1911) (We
have no civil damage statute similar to that prevailing in many states.)4 Britton v. Samuels, 143 Ky. 129, 136 S. W. 143 (1911).4 8 Supra n. 32.
-203 Ky. 508, 262 S. W 619 (1924).
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the husband to earn money 51 It is maccurate to instruct the
jury to find for the plaintiff in "such sum as you may believe
from the evidence will fairly and reasonably compensate deced-
ent's estate."
It is interesting to note that the damages so recovered never
belonged to the estate 2 and so do not pass under the will.53
But under the earlier statute such was not the case.5 4 The dis-
tribution is specially provided for by statute. The distributees
under it are not entitled to be reimbursed out of the general
estate as against the distributees under the will, for funeral ex-
penses, attorney's fees and cost of administering the recovery 55
Motson for removal. If a defendant railway company,
which is a nonresident of the state, is made a co-defendant with
its negligent servant, the fact that the servant is joined solely
for the purpose of preventing removal of the action to the Fed-
eral court does not have the effect of requiring removal,-6 pro-
vided there was sufficient ground on the merits for the joinder of
the servant. But if after plaintiff's evidence is all in,'and it is
apparent that plaintiff could have had no reasonable ground to
join the servant it is not then too late for a motion to remove the
action to the Federal court on the ground of diversity of citizen-
ship.57 But if a joint cause of action is stated, the defendant
must set out all the facts showing the right of removal and they
must be made to appear in the record when the motion is made.58
The Act of Congress provides that such motion may be made in
the state court "at the time or any time before defendant is
required to answer".. If. the defendant files its answer, it waives
its right to petition to remove. If such petition is filed and it is
overruled but it should later appear that it should have been
sustained, the transfer may thereafter be made. The defendant
" Supra n. 49; Archer v. Bowling, 166 Ky. 139, 179 S. W 15 (1915),
Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. 146 (1859).
5 Supra n. 39.
5Sturges v. St~irges, 126 Ky. 80, 102 S. W. 884 (1907).
"'Berg v. Berg, 105 Ky. 80, 48 S. W 432 (1898).
5 O'Malley v. McLean, 113 Ky. 1, 67 S. W 11 (1902).
'8Winston v. I. C. By. Co., 111 Ky. 594, 65 S. W 13 (1901).
51Dudley v. I. C. Biy. Co., 127 Ky. 221, 96 S. W 835 (1907).
8. C. By. Co. v. Sheegog, 126 Ky. 252, 103 S. W. 323 (1907).
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will not be permitted to answer and thus proceed with the trial
and thereafter make the motion for the first time.59
II. Tim SURVIVAL OF TORT ACTIONS UNDER SECTION TEm
At common law in general contract actions survived,60 but
tort actions did not survive.('
Since contract actions (save those where the gravamen
sounded in tort) survived without statutory provision, our
courts hold that where the gravamen is breach of contract the
action cannot be brought under section ten. There may be
reasons why the personal representative would prefer to sue
under section six protected by the survival provision of section
ten especially in view of the possibility of vindictive damages.
Thus, m Lewis v Taylor62 the injured party was a strike
breaker whom defendant had promised to protect with a suffi-
cient guard. After his death as a result of an attack by strikers
his personal representative was not permitted to sue under sec-
tions six and ten. There was no breach of a common law duty
So a judgment against a defendant in bastardy proceedings who
dies, continues in force against his personal representative. 63
Similarly, recovery cannot be had under section 6, where defend-
ant landlord, in consideration of the acceptance of a lease for
another year by the tenant, agrees to repair a certain cistern
though because of the breach of the agreement to repair tenant's
child loses its life in the cistern.6 4 So if a physician is under
contract for services by the year, and refuses to attend a member
of the promisee's family when called and death occurs as a re-
sult, there is no recovery under section six.65 In Winnegar v.
Central Pass. B~y. Co.06 where defendhnt's conductor assaulted
decedent, a passenger, it was held that an action for personal
injuries arising from an assault would survive as a contract
" Cin. N. 0. and T P By. Co. v. Evans, 129 Ky. 152, 110 S. W S44(1908).
Emmons v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 674, 24 S. W 956 (1923).
a See my articles in 19 Ky. Law Jour. 195, "Survival of Claims for
and Against Executors and Administrators" (1931), and in 29 Mich.
Law Rev. 969, "A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort
Actions for and Against Executors and Aministrators," (1931).
112 Ky. 845, 66 S. W 1044 (1902).
Supra n. 60.
Dice v. Zwezgart, 161 Ky. 646, 171 S. W. 195 (1914).
"Randall v. Snyder, 139 Ky. 159, 129 S. W. 562 (1910).
85 Ky. 547, 4 S. W 237 (1887).
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action though it would not survive as a tort action. In Conner
v. Paul, 7 however, where an apothecary's clerk delivered poison
instead of the proper drug, it was held that the action for injur-
ies would survive death of the purchaser under section 10. In
such cases it seems thus one may choose whether he will sue on
the contract or in tort. Actions for assault where there is no
contractual relationship existing at the same time do not sur-
vive.0 8 The statute is not broad enough to include penal actions
and they do not survive. 9
Our section ten reads.
"Actions that survive. No right of action for personal injury or
injury to real or personal estate shall cease or die with the person
injuring or injured, except actions for assault, slander, criminal con-
versation, and so much of the action for malicious prosecution as is
intended to recover for the personal injury; but for any injury other
than those excepted, an action may be brought or revived by the per-
sonal representative, or against the personal representative, heir or
devisee, in the same manner as causes of action founded on contract."
In order that any action not based upon contract may sur-
vive, provision for it must be found within the statute. Hence
in Kentucky there is no survivorship in an election contest where
the contestee dies pending an appeal after judgment has passed
in favor of contestant.70 It was declared that at common law
courts had no jurisdiction to try contested elections, that the
office is not an inheritance, and there is no statutory provision
for survival. The fact that the losing party must pay the costs
is not sufficient for revivor of the appeal. The same rule is ap-
plied where the action is for assault and plaintiff dies before
judgment. 1 A different rule was applied, however, in Taylor v
Beckkam72 where the Lieutenant-Governor was entitled to revive
the contest which had not been decided during the life of the
contestant.
The English statute of TV Edward 3 permitted a recovery
6 75 Ky. 144 (1876).
61 Veatch v. Derrsck, 224 Ky. 332, 6 S. W (2d) 279 (1928) (The mar-
shal's agent, the deputy, assaulted B. The marshal died.)
1, Cowan v. Campbell, 56 Ky. 522 (1856) (The statute required of
all persons who held a life estate in slaves to file a list annually with
the county court under a $100 penalty. A had received dower slaves
of his wife, coming to her from her former husband, and failed to
make the return. The action on the penalty did not survive his death.)
" Galvin v. ,Shafer, 130 Ky. 563, 113 S. W. 485 (1908).
Slhzelds v. Rowland, 151 Ky. 136, 151 S. W 408 (1912).
"108 Ky. 278, 56 S. W. 177 (1896).
K. .- 2
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for trespass to personal property which statute was liberally
interpreted so as to include also actions arising in case. In Ken-
tucky a similar statute was passed in 1797 though it was some-
what broader."3 But remedies for personal injuries were cut off
by the death of either of the parties prior to judgment as at com-
mon law 74 In 1812 a statute was passed which was substantial-
ly like our present act, section ten,75 save that no -provision was
made for injuries to real estate 6 This addition was made in
184277 and the two provisions were united in 1893 under the
present section ten.78
Injurnes to the Person.
It is clear that under our statute actions for all injuries to
property both real and personal now survive. All injuries to
the person save those excepted, survive. Injuries to the person
may arise from negligence or they may be intended. Again
intended injuries may arise from an assault for which the remedy
was trespass or they may arise indirectly from the intended -act
of the defendant as for example, where an assault is not done
directly to the person or is made by a servant at the instance of
his master. Assaults may be made also by a servant for which
the master is liable solely on account of the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior and not from authorization. The common
law action for such injuries would be case rather than trespass.
In Meyer v ZolI79 a young child was bitten by defendant's
dog. The child died and the personal representative sued not
for death by wrongful act but for the personal injuries and
attendant expenses. The defense made was that the parents had
settled the claim for pain and suffering during the child's life-
1 Littell's Laws, Sec. 55, p. 624, 1 Morehead & Brown Statute
Law of Kentucky, Sec. 55, p. 670. See also Lynn v. Sisk, 48 Ky. 135(1848) (An action was revived by scare facias against a sheriff for
excessive levy.) But cf. hzeldgs- v. Rowland, supra n. 71. (An action
held not to survive the death of defepdant by whose negligence plain-
tiff's horse was killed by reason of a defective bridge.)
,
4Shields v. Rowland, supra n. 71. (Defendant in an action for
assault and battery died after judgment but pending an appeal and
the action was held not to survive as at common law.)
' Sec. 1, M. & B., p. 88 and the amendment at p. 86.
' Kennedy v. M'Afee, 11 Ky. 169 (1822).
3 St. Law of Ky. (Loughborough), p. 573.
, Prescott v. Grtmes, 143 Ky. 191, 136 S. W 206 (1911) (An action
for waste by life tenant now survives the life tenant's death.)
10119 Ky. 480, 84 S. W. 543 (1905).
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time and had granted a full discharge. The reason for suing
under section ten rather than under section six is clear. No re-
,covery could be had under the latter section since the action must
be brought for their benefit and payment to them of their claim
would be an equitable bar to recovery for their benefit. But it
was held that the personal representative of the child to whom
the cause of action descended was not barred by the settlement
since the parents did not own the cause of action for which they,
purported to settle. Recovery may also be allowed for pain and
suffering and for medical and funeral expenses though the injury
may result in death.80 Mere acts of negligence do not-constitute
an assault and so are not excepted.8 '
-Another type of injuries frequently called personal injuries
are those offenses which affect the more zntangiible interests of
personality, such for example, as slander and libel, crninnal con-
versation, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and the
like. The older law classified these offenses on the basis of the
remedy to be applied and with respect to these last named
offenses, the remedy was case save that of false imprisonment
which at least technically involved a trespass. Assault and
battery though a typical trespass, also affects the integrity,
personality, and self respect of the party assaulted. I should
suppose that the same desire for retaliation does not arise where
the injury is indirect. The law seeks to avoid the exercise of
self-help. But the impulse to self-help does not arise in case of
an assault where defendant is liable on the ground of respondea
superior The statute probably did not except assaults from its
operation because they were trespasses but rather because they
provoked physical retaliation, which temptation is removed by
death. An assault may be classified both as a direct injury to the
physical person and as a wrong to the more intangible interests
of personality 8 2
The following cases have arisen (a) actions for libel;83
"E.den v. L. d- E. Ry. Co., 53 Ky. 165 (1853) (Injury by railroad
resulting in death caused before the wrongful death act.)
s"Perkzns v. gtein, 94 Ky. 433, 22 S. W. 649 (1893) (Defendant'a
servant ran over plaintiff with a wagon and plaintiff died.)
OaFor a fuller discussion of such injuries see 29 Mich. Law lev.
969, 979.
8.Johnson v'. Halleman, 102 Ky. 163, 43 S. W 226 (1897).
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(b) alienation of affections ;s' (c) unlawful arrest;8 (d) malici-
ous prosecution."6 Our court has held that slander includes
libel, that alienation of affections is like criminal conversation,
that the action for unlawful arrest does survive and therefore is
not included within assault nor malicious prosecution and that
malicious prosecution is expressly excepted by the statute. We
might well, however, have anticipated that illegal arrest would
be regarded as ejusdem generss with malicious prosecution.
Actions for Death and for Injuries Mutually Exclusive.
It is well understood that though an action for injuries to
the person may survive to the personal representative in the
proper case under this section yet the personal representative
cannot also sue for damages for wrongful death (if the injuries
finally result in death) either in the same or in a separate suit
and that a settlement of the claim for injuries made by the
decedent with the wrongdoer will be a bar to any further
action.8 7
This rule may seem arbitrary inasmuch as the action for in-
juries was one belonging to the decedent existing at common law
winch survived to the personal representatives by statute and the
recovery belongs to the estate, whereas the action for wrongful
death is a new action which did not exist at common law and
never belonged to the decedent and the recovery is not assets,
save as under our statute it is provided that such amount goes
to the estate as is required for "funeral expenses, the cost of
adninstration and costs about the recovery including attorney's
fees" 88 But the reason for the rule, and it is undoubtedly the
majority rule in the United States, is fairly clear. If a recovery
should be allowed for each then the wrongdoer pays twice for
Gross v. Ledford, 190 Ky. 526, 228 S. W 24 (1921).
Huggzns v. Toler, 64 Ky. 192 (1866).
OFrancts v. Burnett, 84 Ky. 23 (1886).
17 Lewzs v. Taylor Coal Co., 112 Ky. 845, 66 S. W. 1044 (1902),
Flansford v. Payne, 74 Ky. 380 (1897), 0. & N. By. Co. v. Barclay, 102
Ky. 16, 43 S. W 177 (1897), Con-ner v. Paul, 75 Ky. 144 (1876) L. &
N. By. Co. v. McElwasn, 98 Ky. 700, 34 S. W 236 (1896), Hackett v.
L. & N. Ry. Co., 95 Ky. 236, 24 S. W. 871 (1894), Donahue v. Drexler,
82 Ky. 157 (1884), Louisville Ry. Co. v. Raymond, 135 Ky 738, 123
S. W 281 (1909), 0. & 0. By. v. Banks, 142 Ky. 746, 135. S. W 285
(1911), L. & N. v. Sanders, 86 Ky. 259, 5 S. W 563 (1887).
O'Malley v. McLean, 113 Ky. 1, 67 S. W. 11 (1902).
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the same act. Whether the matter be one for injuries or for
death is merely a matter of degree and the wrongdoer is not
primarily concerned as to the ownership of the recovery provd-
ing that after he has paid he is free. Further the defenses in
the one case are precisely and necessarily the same as in the
other case.8 9
Contributory Negligence, Assumption of Risk, Fellow Servant
Rule.
Sections four and six must constantly be construed with
respect to section ten. In the first place it is observed that just
as contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the negligence
of a fellow servant, common law defenses, were available as
defenses to an action for personal injuries, so were they avail-
able as defenses at least under section 6.90
Assault Resulting in Death.
Section ten dates back to 1812 and so antedates our Lord
69 But see Proctor Coal Co. v. Beaver, 151 Ky. 839, 152 S. W 965(1913), where both claims are enforceable'if they arise in a state
permitting both.
"' That question does not seem to have arisen under section four.
L. d- P Canal Co. v. Murhphy, 72 Ky. 522 (1872) (Contributory negli-
gence), Warren v. Jeunesee, 122 S. W 862 (Ky. 1909) (Contributory
negligence and assumption of risk), Passamaneck v. Louisville Ry.
Co., 98 Ky. 195, 32 S. W 620 (1895) (Negligence of parents contributing
to death of young child), .bnck v. L. d- N. Ry. Co., 107 Ky. 370, 54
S. W. 184 (1899) (Application of fellow-servant rule. Held also Sec-
tion 241 of Constitution did not affect defenses), Cincinnati N. 0. and
T. By. Co. v. Cook, 113 Ky. 161, 67 S. W 333 (1902) (Brakeman and
engineer are not co-equal servants) L. & X. Ry. Co. v. Collins, 64 Ky.
114 (1865) (One engineer killed by the negligence of the conductor of
another train-a different line of service), Volz v. Chesapeake Ry. Co.,
95 Ky. 188, 24 S. W 119 (1893) (Servants are co-equals and no re-
covery), L. d- N. v. Brooks, 83 Ky. 129 (1885) (Inferior servant died
as result of negligence of superior servant), L. & N. v. Moore, 83 Ky.
675 (1886) (Ry. company liable for death of engineer through negli-
gence of track boss, being in a different line of service.) (Case of in-
ferior and superior servant), L. & N. v. Moore, 83 Ky. 675
(1886) (same), Casey v. L. & N., 84 Ky. 79 (1886) (Common laborers
and fellow-servants), 'Harms v. Rex Coal Co., 177 Ky. 630, 197 S. W
1075 (1917) (Coal miners, operating different trips of cars and not
fellow-servants in same line of employment), L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Collins,
63 Ky. 11 (1865) (Common laborer carrying ties loses leg by negli-
gence of engineer, no recovery under earlier act unless there was
-ilful negligence), Lf. Fort Hill Stone Co. v. Orm, 84 Ky. 183 (1886),
but see Wagner v. Wetmore, 12 K. L. R. 638 (1890), and Greenwood v.
-McHenry Coal Co., 14 K. L. I. 336 (1892).
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Campbell's Act by forty-one years and the same construction
was placed on it as was placed on the English survival statutes,
viz., that it does not apply of its own force to cause a survival
of actions for wrongful death,91 There could be no recovery if
death were nnimediate. 92
An action for damages for injuries arising from an assault
does not survive under section ten.93 But a very unusual theory
has developed in Kentucky Thus while an action for an assault
does not survive the death of either party, yet if the action is
brought under section four (and probably also under section
six) as for example where A -was feloniously killed by B the
action will survive the death of B 94 by virtue of section ten.
Naturally in the case of death by wrongful act, if there is any
remedy it accrues only when one of the parties has died. But it
generally is held that there is no survivorship of wrongful
death actions after the death of the wrongdoer unless
the statute specifically so provides95 and our statute does
not do so. Virginia has gone even farther and in a highly tech-
meal decision held that if the person whose life is wrongfully
taken by another, yet survives that other person (A gave B a
mortal wound and then shot and killed himself instantly, dying
before B) no cause of action for wrongful death survives against
the personal representative of the wrongdoer because the cause
of action did not arise until after his death.96 The Virgina
statute, however, provides that the action for wrongful death
shall survive the death of the wrongdoer. Illinois alone has
taken the same view as Kentucky that a cause of action for
wrongful death shall survive the death of the wrongdoer unply-
ing such result from the statute which provides for the survival
"0E1den v. L,. & N. By. Co., 53 Ky. 165 (1853) (Death caused by
negligence.)
" Louisville Ry. Co. v. Raymond, 135 Ky. 738, 123 S. W. 281 (1909).
"Hunt v. Mutter, 238 Ky. 396, 38 S. W. (2d) 215 (1931) (H shot
and wounded L. M., and H was immediately thereafter killed by G. M.
L. M.'s cause of action did not survive), Anderson v. Arnold, 79 Ky.
370 (1881) (Negligent wounding of A by B is an assault and battery.)
8 Morehead v. Bittner, 106 Ky. 523, 50 S. W. 857 (1899), Merrill v.
.Puckett, 93 S. W 912 (Ky. 1906), Hunt v. Mutter, 238 Ky. 396, 38 S. W.
(2d) 215 (1931).
"ODavs v, Nichols, 54 Ark. 858, 15 S. W 880 (1891), and cases
there cited; Hamilton v. Jones, 125 Ind. 176, 25 N. E. 192 (1890),
Bates v. Sylvester, 205 Mo. 493, 104 S. W. 73 (1907), Johnson v.
Farmer, 89 Tex. 610, 35 S. W. 1062 (1896).
"Beavers v. Putnam, 110 Va. 713, 67 S. E. 353 (1910).
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of actions to the person. But the result there is easier to reach
than the result n Kentucky because unlike Kentucky the Itlinois
statute does not except from the survival statute injuries arising
from assault. It seems extremely difficult that wilful shooting
resulting in personal injuries shall be regarded as an assault
and that the action shall not survive death of either party but
that a shooting resulting in death is not an assault and the action
shall survive the death of defendant. The result seems desirable
but the interpretation seems nghly questionable. The court-
says that the gravamen of the action is not the assault but the
injury to the widow and children.
Problems of Surmval as Affected by the Law of Conflict of Laws.
(a) It has been held that the personal representative of a
non-resident injured in a state whose law does not provide for
survivorsbip for personal injury cases, cannot recover an Ken-
ttMky.9 7 He may recover, however, if there is "a survvorship
statute in the jurisdiction where the injury occurred.98 If the
injury occurred in Kentucky the non-resident decedent's per-
sonal representative may sue.9 9 It is also held that the personal
representative of a Kentucky resident may sue in Kentucky for
death by wrongful act done in another state whose wrongful
death statute is sumilar.1 ° But a non-resident's personal repre-
sentative may not sue where the act occurred in a foreign state
if admnnstration is granted for the sole purpose of bringing this
action.1 1 The court regards the statutory provision for sur-
vivorship as not affecting the right but rather the remedy,1 0 2
hence an action brought before death here on a foreign cause of
action winch does not survive by the law of the place where the
act was committed may still survive under our statute.1 3
(b) Advantage cannot be taken of the fact that plaintiff
OTAustin v. Pittsburgh Ry. Go., 122 Ky. 804, '91 S. W. 742 (1906).
"Bruce v. Cincinnati By. Co., 83 Ky. 174 (1885).
" Young v. L. & X. Ry. Co., 121 Ky. 483, 89 S. W. 475 (1905).
vo L. W N. Ry. Go. v. Whitlow, 105 Ky. 1, 43 S. W 711 (1898).1
'HaZl v. L. & N. RBy. Co., 102 Ky. 480, 43 S. W 698 (1897), Turner
v. L. ; X, 110 Ky. 879, 62 S. W. 1025 (1901), Davis v. Morton, 68 Ky.
160 (1868). Under different style, 43 S. W. 698 (1897);Turner v. L. &
X., 62 S. W 1025 (dictum). But Brown v. L. & IV. R y . Co., 97 'Ky. 228,
30 S. W 639 (1895) seems to be contra.
112 Supra n. 97.
1* See B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Joy, 173 U. S. 226 (1898).
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is a personal representative appointed m- another state to bring
an action that would be barred here if she sued as a local per-
sonal representative and the action is also barred in the state of
appointment. Thus, an Indiana personal representative sued in
Indiana for personal injuries. Thereafter she sued here in the
capacity of the Indiana personal representative for wrongful
cieath. Since under our statute the first action is a bar to the
second, recovery is not allowable because of the cause of action
being foreign. On the other hand, if a Kentucky resident is in-
jured .by wrongful act in another state and dies as a consequence,
recovery may be had both for the injuries and for the death if
the double recovery is allowed by the law of that state though
the action is brought in Kentucky and if the accident had occur-
red here the plaintiff would have to elect between the two causes
of action.'0 4
(c) Again in Kentucky contributory negligence is a de-
8fense in an action for wrongful death. It is not a complete
defense in Tennessee.' 0 5 If a Kentucky resident is killed in
Tennessee and his personal representative sues here is that
defense permissible I Our court held that the law of Tennessee
was applicable. This defense pertains rather to the right than
the remedy But it is observed that if the defense of set-off or
counterclaim were offered under similar circumstances where the
Tennessee law did not permit of it, still it would be allowed
here,' 0 6 and the same rule applies to pleading the statute of
limitations. In L. & N Ry. Co. v. Grahqm,10 7 the measure of
damages of the jurisdiction where the wrong occurred was
applied and it was also held that gross or wilful negligence need
not be proved since that degree of negligence was not essential
to a recovery in the state where the wrong occurred though in
Kentucky at that time the defendant was not liable unless gross
or wilful negligence were alleged and proved.
(d) Suppose a decedent domiciled in Ohio were killed in
Kentucky by the negligent act of an employer domiciled in West
Virginia, that the domiciliary personal representative settles
with the employer at the latter's domicile after the appointment
1 Proctor Coal Co. v. Beaver, 151 Ky. 839, 152 S. W 965 (1913).
'-1 Supra n. 100.
'100 Supra n. 101 (Davis v. Morton).
1O?98 Ky. 688, 33 S. W 1107 (1896).
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of a Kentucky personal representative but that the former has
no notice of such appointment. It is held that such a settlement
will discharge the liability under our section 3880. The domi-
ciliary personal representative may receive anytlnng voluntarily
released to him.
In conclusion one may observe that there seems no longer to
be any policy involved in continuing these several statutory
provisions for actions for death by wrongful act. The remedy
of section five seems never to have been pursued. Section four
is fully covered an section six. Under section four the widow
and the nnnor children should be joint parties. The principal
and the agent may be joint defendants but a plaintiff may not
join the servants as defendants merely for the purpose of main-
tainag the action in the state courts. The doctrine of
respondeat supersor does not seem to prevail an wrongful death
actions against a deputy sheriff or a deputy city marshal.
The exceptions an our survival statute do not seem to be based
upon any principle. If any tort actions should survive it would
seem that all should survive where there have been pecuniary
losses to one party or an unjust enrichment to the other. To
provide that assault actions shall not survive simply because of
the nature of the action seems to be without rhyme or reason.
To deny survival of actions for slander, criminal conversation,
etc., is defensible on the ground that there is usually no pecum-
ary loss on the one hand nor profit on the other. We should
definitely choose between the alternative (a) to permit survival
an all cases where there is a remedy inter vivos and (b) to pernt
survival in those cases only. where the inheritable assets have
been decreased by the wrongdoer's act.
